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OPINION 
__________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Ayala King makes numerous claims of error in appealing his conviction and 
sentence for several offenses arising from his participation in the murder and robbery of 
Leayle King. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that none of his arguments are 
meritorious, and we will therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.1   
I. 
 Because we write for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history, we set forth only those facts necessary to our conclusion. King contends that the 
district court’s decision to limit time for closing arguments violated the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  We review a district court’s trial management for abuse of 
discretion.2  Accordingly, we will not disturb a district court’s managerial decisions 
unless there is a “definite and firm conviction that the [court] committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached.”3  A court abuses its discretion if it “bases its 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.  
1 This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995). 
3 Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence.”4  
 District courts have inherent power to control the cases that come before them, 
including the length of closing arguments.5  Because “the imposition of time limits 
increases the efficiency of the trial,” a district court may set time limits on closing 
arguments.6  Here, the court notified both parties of the thirty minute time constraint at 
the charging conference the night before closing arguments.  This restriction was 
appropriate given the length and complexity of the trial.  We see nothing to suggest that 
counsel’s ability to craft and deliver an effective summation was the least bit 
compromised by the very reasonable time limitation the district court imposed.   
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the 
thirty minute time limit. 
 Next, King argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress an 
incriminating statement he made to police.  Our standard of review for this issue is 
mixed: We review the underlying factual findings for clear error, but exercise plenary 
review over the district court’s application of law to those facts.7  
 The detective who took King’s statement testified that King read it out loud before 
signing it and had an opportunity to make corrections.  The detective also testified that 
she was unaware of King’s underage girlfriend, and no one threatened King with 
                                              
4 McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Grider v. 
Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
5 See Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 105 (3d Cir. 2001); Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 609. 
6 Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 609.  
7 United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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potential charges unless he signed.  Accordingly, it is apparent that King’s testimony to 
the contrary was simply not credible.  The district court found the detective to be a 
credible witness and was entitled to rely on her testimony.8  Therefore, we find no error 
here.  
 King further argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions.9  Our review of sufficiency of the evidence is “highly differential.”10  We 
must uphold the jury’s verdict if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”11 
 At trial, the government presented video evidence showing King and codefendant 
Murrell inside the House of Rajah as Murrell took Leayle’s jewelry out of his (Murrell’s) 
pocket and presented it to the clerk for sale.  There was testimony from the clerks at both 
jewelry stores regarding the behavior of Murrell and King at each store.  Video 
surveillance captured King and Murrell cashing the check they received for the stolen 
jewelry, and a search of King’s girlfriend’s room produced $1,410 cash, a .380 caliber 
firearm, and 9mm ammunition. 
                                              
8 King also alleges that he was handcuffed for the entire day and not fed until the late afternoon.  Both of these 
allegations are contradicted by testimony from Det. Tyson and Det. Esprit.  To the extent that such circumstances 
would be relevant to determining whether King gave his inculpatory statement under duress, it is clear that the 
testimony was not credited. 
9 King makes a blanket insufficiency of the evidence claim as to all of his charges without distinguishing between 
them and their respective elements. 
10 United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 
11 Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)).  
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 King’s incriminating statement includes a detailed description of Leayle as the “fat 
man with the big chain” as well as Leayle’s car and home.  King’s statement further 
describes what Leayle was wearing the night of the shooting and events related to the 
robbery itself.  King’s statement identifies Murrell as the one who took the chain from 
Leayle and also recounts a conversation King and Murrell had about selling Leayle’s 
jewelry for cash.  
 At trial, King denied making the inculpatory statement to police and also denied 
engaging in the conduct described in that statement.  Instead, his testimony was 
consistent with the first statement he gave to police, which was exculpatory.  He insisted 
that a man he “knew” gave him Leayle’s jewelry on the street.  On cross, King could 
neither identify this man nor his address.  The jury obviously rejected his testimony.  
Viewing the evidence against King in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we 
must,12 it is clear that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements each of the 
charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and King’s argument to the contrary is 
frivolous. 
 Finally, King alleges that the district court’s actions during trial deprived him of 
due process of law in five instances.  We disagree as to each assertion.  Our review is for 
abuse of discretion.13  First, King contends the district court deprived him of his due 
process rights during the second suppression hearing.  Specifically, he claims the district 
court erroneously refused to hear witness testimony regarding the way in which police 
                                              
12 Id.   
13 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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removed him from his home during this second hearing.  The purpose of a second 
suppression hearing is to allow a defendant to present new evidence.14  Here, the district 
court granted the second hearing to clarify testimony one of the detectives gave at the 
first hearing.  The witnesses King wanted to call during his second suppression hearing 
were available at the first; King simply failed to call them.  Accordingly, the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hear their testimony during the second hearing. 
 Second, King argues that the district court should have revealed to counsel and the 
jury that it intended to extend trial time beyond normal business hours.  King claims that 
the district court forced the jury, without notice, to serve two long days, and, as a result, 
the jurors were eager to “get [the trial] over with” and rushed their verdict.15  However, 
nothing in the record supports this conjecture, and King fails to cite any authority 
supporting his claim that the extension of trial time beyond normal business hours 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.16  
 Third, King argues the police induced his second incriminating statement by 
threatening to charge him with statutory rape of his underage girlfriend.  King alleges an 
unidentified detective spoke to his father about this possibility.  He claims that a witness 
could have corroborated this conversation, but the district court incorrectly refused to let 
her testify.  The district court’s decision was not erroneous because the witness’s 
                                              
14 See United States v. Ryles, 451 F.2d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 1971) (noting that the second suppression hearing gave the 
defendant the opportunity “to present any pertinent new evidence”). 
15 Appellant’s Br. 28. 
16 See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[a]n appellant’s brief must 
contain his or her argument, which must incorporate appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations 
to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United 
States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding it “difficult to determine if the court abused its 
discretion” because the appellant failed to “specifically identify” the court’s error and failed to provide authority in 
support of his argument). 
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testimony would have been inadmissible hearsay.17  Accordingly, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in excluding this witness testimony.  
 Fourth, King asserts that his father should have been allowed to testify regarding a 
conversation between him, King, and the police about his girlfriend.  However, the 
district court correctly excluded that testimony as inadmissible hearsay in violation of 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 
 Lastly, King alleges that the district court erroneously refused to let him read his 
first, non-incriminating statement to the jury.  A district court is entitled to exclude 
relevant evidence to avoid wasting time.18  Here, the district court concluded there was a 
more “expeditious manner” to present the inconsistencies between King’s first and 
second statements. 19  Instead of permitting King to read the entirety of his first statement 
to the jury, the court instructed King to read the statement to himself and indicate any 
inaccurate portions.  This does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
II. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and 
sentence. 
                                              
17 FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see Appellant’s Br. 29. 
18 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
19 J.A., Vol. III 723. 
